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The very term ‘political economy’ is something that already names an ambiguous, 
even impossible, relationship. Derived from the Greek oikonomia (i.e. matters of 
household management and regulation), economy is something that designates a 
certain domestication; the keeping of good order. The political, on the other hand, is 
always that which upsets/challenges the order of ‘the household’ in the broadest sense 
of the term. The political not only bears witness to the impossibility of any ultimate 
Household it is also – and as a consequence - that which liberates the very possibility 
for developing new forms of social organization, identity and belonging. This is the 
paradox to which Lefort refers (1986): the political establishes the authenticity of 
every institution only to the extent that it shows the essential historicity and 
contingency of their inauguration. Every institution depends for its being on a political 
process of institutivity which it cannot incorporate or domesticate within it. Every 
household depends upon a certain impossible excess that is always ‘promised’ to 
something beyond what currently exists; to something Other. 
This chapter has two central objectives. The first comprises an exploration of 
the aspect of the political in political economy. It will do this primarily through a 
critique of Luhmann’s systems theory which has become increasingly influential in 
contemporary approaches to (international) political economy. This critique will be 
developed mainly through a postmarxist and post-structuralist approach in which the 
emphases are on discourse, negativity and antagonism. Whereas many of the 
traditional perspectives on political economy - of both liberal and Marxist persuasions 
- have tended to view the economy in terms of an extra-discursive or extra-political 
infrastructure, this paper affirms the opposite: the economy is fully a discursive 
construction and as such is essentially prone to political subversion and recomposition 
in respect of other discursive positions. 
Second, however, the paper is concerned with the development of an 
analytical approach that also addresses the opposing register: that is to say, the 
economy of the political. With its compelling emphasis on contingency (the ‘primacy 
of the political’) both post-structuralism and post-marxism have arguably tended to 
overlook, or downplay, the way in which the political becomes economized in a given 
conjuncture. This is not to endorse any kind of return to a back-to-basics economism. 
 2 
On the contrary, the point is rather that through a critique of economism we should 
not then embrace the opposite fetish of a pure politicism; both registers need to be 
taken into account precisely on the basis of their mutual interplay and subversion. 
There are two main aspects to this economization of the political. The first 
comprises the standard ideological attempt to present the economy in thoroughly de-
politicized and naturalistic terms in which the keeping of economic order is viewed as 
a purely pragmatic and technocratic enterprise; as Blair has put it, there is ‘no left or 
right in economic policy only good and bad’ (1998). On this view modern 
globalization is a spontaneous and irrepressible force of integration that is leading 
progressively to the ontological society: the final utopian order of humankind 
synthesized through a mature, sympathetic and responsible liberal capitalism. But 
second there is a deeper and more subtle aspect to this economization. Today’s 
conjuncture does not simply repress the political, rather it engages reflexively with the 
latter and in such a way that it attempts to channel and compose it in paradigmatic 
fashion. There is in this sense a certain glamouring of the political that endeavours to 
bind and convey its energies in and through certain key incantations and watchwords: 
difference, consensus, inclusivity, tolerance, multi-culturalism and so on. To change 
the metaphor, the political is something that tends to be recruited to, and configured 
within, a characteristic ‘grammar’ that allows for the development of certain lines of 
questioning, indictment and critique but crucially not others. In these broader terms 
the economization of the political is something that stakes out historically the realm of 
the possible against that which is deemed impossible. There exists, in tendential 
terms, a kind of (non-Hegelian)  dialectical totality in which a particular order already 
takes into account its own failures and deficiencies and to call for its own 
‘transformation’ in typically specious, and grammatical, ways. 
This paper represents a speculative contribution to the development of a 
broader approach to political economy – both in terms of an analysis of the 
functioning of the political in the economy and the economization of the political – 
that focuses on the way in which the very sense of the possible is circumscribed 
through markers of impossibility. 
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The persistence of the political 
 
The history of Marxist thought reveals a progressive undermining of the idea of the 
economy as an autonomous entity with endogenous laws. With the likes of Hilferding, 
Gramsci and the later postmarxists, what begins to emerge is a new type of 
perspective in which the political itself becomes increasingly apparent as an object of 
theoretical reflection. To this effect, the economy has been shown to depend on more 
and more conditions of possibility that, far from expressing any cosmic decree, are 
themselves the result of contingent political practices. Yet the tension between 
naturalism and the logic of the political is already revealed within Marx’s own 
thought. 
One of the great achievements of Marx consists in what Hesse (1980) might 
call his metaphoric re-description of the economy; a re-description that, for the first 
time, sought to analyse economic relations in terms of social context. Marx was 
vehemently opposed to those conventions of political economy that attempted to 
derive economic meaning, and to justify vast inequalities of wealth, on the grounds of 
a mythical state of origins. 
In contrast to abstract ideals, Marx affirmed the social character of labour such 
that the individual’s potential for production and self-development is always 
dependent upon a given framework, or mode of production, that in turn reflects 
certain power relations; a balance of forces between classes. This enabled Marx to 
advance a powerful critique against naturalistic conceptions of capitalism that have 
persisted from Smith and Locke right through to Friedman and the dominant forms of 
neo-classical economics. Against such pieties concerning ‘free’ labour contracts in an 
open market, Marx demonstrated how workers are forced to sell their labour power as, 
under capitalism, they are denied access to the means of production and subsistence. 
For Marx, the classical liberal paradigm turned precisely on the attempt to finesse the 
power basis of capitalism. 
A logic of contingency is already apparent within Marx insofar as there is a 
fundamental emphasis on the economy as a human construction rather than an 
underlying form waiting to be discovered. By de-objectifying the economy and 
showing its reality to be the result of wider power relations that generates its 
principles of construction, there is a clear sense in which Marx expanded the 
dimension of the political. At the same time, this expansion is limited as, in a contrary 
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movement, there is a re-absorption of the political within a new form of objectivism. 
For Marx the problem was not positivity itself but rather the liberal version of it. 
Accordingly he sought a restoration of the modernist enterprise through the 
affirmation of a metaphysical laws of history foretelling of an ultimate resolution. 
The political shone all too briefly in Marx. Yet it was not something that could 
be extinguished. Indeed the subsequent history of the Marxist imagination is 
characterised by a tendential ebbing and flowing between the idealist search for 
certainties and their persistent denial by the political. This is reflected in an increasing 
de-stabilisation of the traditional economic/non-economic distinction. Rejecting the 
view of the economy as a self-enclosed order Hilferding (1985), for example, focused 
on the way that the modern economy developed within the terms of a nationalist 
framework. Gramsci (1976), of course, developed this line of enquiry even further. 
For Gramsci, the economy cannot be separated from ideological and cultural practices 
but is articulated with these phenomena in a characteristic historic bloc. By 
developing a radically contextualist approach, Gramsci showed that nothing 
automatically follows from economic relations and that we cannot predict whether 
they will be articulated in nationalist, liberal or social democratic terms (or other 
terms). A basic undecidability exists whose resolution will depend upon the outcome 
of concrete forces in political struggle.  And the types of resolution that result will 
have crucial consequences for the construction and functioning of the economic 
space. 
In his emphasis on the undecidable and political character of structuring 
principles, Gramsci may be said to render visible the political as a basic dimension of 
all social ordering and identification. We might reasonably argue that Gramsci is 
distinguished in modern thought not so much as a political theorist but as a theorist of 
the political. In his critique of economism, Gramsci provides the theoretical resources 
for politicising political economy and thereby for a new imagination of actively 
radicalising economic practice. 
Yet it would be mistaken to think that theoretical reflection on the political has 
developed only within Marxism. One could cite examples of various thinkers, from 
other traditions, whose interventions have also served to undermine objectivist-
naturalist approaches to the economy: Weber’s analysis of economic development in 
terms of religious-cultural context; Simmel’s argument that the value of money cannot 
be referred to an absolute foundation but depends on a broader network of symbolic 
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exchange; Polanyi’s emphasis on the social conditions of possibility for a ‘market 
economy’; Keynes’ demonstration of the artificial constitution and manipulation of 
the economic ‘ground’ through state intervention. More recently the French regulation 
School has shown that the functioning of the economy is not an endogenous matter 
(as in classical models) but depends on the construction of an entire mode of social 
regulation that transcends the economy as such. Each of these perspectives move 
away from the idea of the economy as a closed autonomous order and towards a view 
that considers the latter in far more contextual and discursive terms (see Daly 1991; 
1999). 
The envisioning of the political, however partial or incomplete, is not 
exclusive to any one tradition, but reflects a synergy of all those themes and 
tendencies that have led to a weakening of idealist thinking about economic reality. 
On this basis a new approach is enabled that affirms the non-natural character of all 
economic order and identity. Such an approach would begin from an analysis of the 
ways in which all economic systems attempt to conceal their essential lack of ground 
through artificial power processes of discursive constitution. It is in this context that 
the work of Luhmann makes an important contribution. 
 
From autonomy to autopoiesis 
Beyond the positivity of systems 
 
Contemporary political economy has drawn increasingly on the work of Luhmann 
and, in particular, his notion of autopoiesis (e.g. Lash and Urry 1994; Leyshon and 
Thrift 1997; Jessop 1990, 2002). The general tendency has been to link autopoiesis 
with a certain endogeny in the development of complex systems of exchange and 
production. Jessop, for example, enlists autopoiesis to underscore his view that the 
economy (specifically, the capitalist market economy) exhibits a radical operational 
autonomy (Jessop 1990, 2002). Notwithstanding this autonomy, Jessop maintains that 
a market economy is further sustained by interdependent forms of regulation and what 
he refers to as ‘social embeddedness’ within the lifeworld of a society (2002). 
While I am in general agreement with this approach I think that there are two 
potential problems that should be addressed. First, Jessop tends to use the notions of 
autonomy and autopoiesis interchangeably and in doing so, I would argue, loses sight 
of the distinctiveness of the latter. Second, and related, there is sometimes an 
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inclination in Jessop to present the idea of economic autonomy in terms of a rather 
traditionalist economy/society division. The point that should be emphasised is not 
that economic practices cannot achieve a certain (relative) autonomy, but that this is 
entirely a matter of politico-discursive constitution in a particular context and is not 
something that can be universalised. The ambiguity surfaces at those points where 
Jessop insists on an analysis that secures a basic distinction between the discursive 
and the extra-discursive (1990: 302; 1999: 2; also Jessop and Sum this volume, Ryner 
this volume). This clearly runs the risk of reproducing a standard formulation whereby 
the economy is implicitly identified with the ‘extra-discursive’ dimensions of material 
reproduction, structural conditions and so on (as if the latter were independent of 
discursive reality and stood outside history). There is thus the potential danger that 
‘social embeddedness’ could be perceived as a simple process of adjustment to, and 
the legitimisation of, an underlying autonomous economic reality. 
Luhmann’s perspective allows for a different approach. Through his theory of 
autopoiesis, Luhmann’s central innovation concerns his problematisation of autonomy 
conceived as extra-discursive foundationalism. At the same time, Luhmann’s position 
is highly ambiguous. If, on the one hand, Luhmann demonstrates the non-grounded 
character of all systems, on the other, he is drawn towards a new type of idealism in 
which society is presented as a positivity of systems that progressively masters all 
distortion. I will argue, in contrast, that the radicalism of Luhmann’s autopoietic 
theory can be developed further by linking it with the postmarxist affirmation of the 
ineradicability of power, negativity and antagonism: that is, by linking it to the notion 
of the political and a transcendence of all positivism. 
Luhmann begins from the position that ‘the world is constituted by the 
differentiation of meaning systems, by the difference between system and 
environment’ (1995: 208). What Luhmann demonstrates is that systems can never be 
grounded in anything solid. It is because of the essential absence of any (extra-
discursive) ground that we have systems in the first place. If an ultimate ground was 
reachable then the logic of systematisation would cease to have any meaning: we 
would simply have infinite presence – a final domestication of the real. 
A system establishes its consistency by differentiating itself from its 
‘environment’: i.e. that which designates the negative correlate of the system, or 
‘simply “everything else”’ (Luhmann 1995: 181). This is achieved through processes 
of self-referral or autopoiesis.1 A system is autopoietic insofar as it manifests the 
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‘recursive application of its own operations’ (Luhmann 1988, p. 336). The coherence 
of a system depends upon its ability to differentiate itself from, but also to engage 
with and interpret, its environment in terms of its code of organisation. 
The system of law, for example, no longer appears arbitrary because of the 
numerous sedimentations of case study, constitutional interpretation, preceding 
judgements and so on; all of which help to reinforce coherence and patterning. Such 
sedimentations serve to repress the fact that there exists no clear point of origin – 
autopoietic routinisation is precisely the illusion of foundation – and that the legal 
system cannot be based on any absolutist conception of Law. 
A system of law requires, in the first place, a basic code for distinguishing 
what is lawful and what is not. But this immediately presents a paradox because the 
legal/illegal distinction is not something that can be determined outside the system of 
law. Furthermore, the question as to whether the legal system itself is legal or illegal is 
strictly unthinkable and undecidable (see Esposito 1991). And this applies to the 
formation of every system. Where a system’s code encounters itself – as in the 
legality/illegality of an existing system of law, the value of a system of valuation, the 
representativeness of a system of representation and so on – the system is confronted 
with a fundamental lack of ground: in short, it is confronted with the political. No 
system is capable of systematising its own principle(s) of construction. 
What autopoiesis shows is that the ‘ground’ of any system is merely the 
artifice of its recursivity. Every foundation is ultimately a phantom of a system’s 
tautological (self-referring) constitution. This is why for Stäheli the ‘self-referential 
system functions as a metaphor for the impossibility of the origin’ (Stäheli 1995: 19). 
The more a system refers to itself the more it serves to underline an essential lack of 
foundation. Autopoiesis is precisely that which acts as a stand-in for the absent 
foundation. 
From this perspective, the idea of autopoiesis has to be strictly separated from 
traditionalist conceptions of autonomy and independence. It is precisely because the 
latter cannot be formed that autopoiesis comes into being. The ‘closure’ of any system 
is purely an artificial effect that depends upon the discursive-contingent practices of 
inclusion/exclusion. On these grounds we can infer the basic paradox governing all 
systematicity: that the lack of origins/foundations makes systems both necessary and 
impossible. 
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This paradox, I would argue, is not sufficiently developed by Luhmann. He 
appears to be irresistibly drawn to an idealist position and his extensive analysis of 
differential system formation becomes simultaneously a major weakness. This is 
particularly apparent in his functionalist account of contradictions and conflict. For 
Luhmann, conflicts and contradictions ‘function as an alarm in society’s immune 
system’ (1995: 387): that is, as a kind of signalling in which ‘(t)he signal merely 
warns, merely flares up, is merely an event – and suggests action in response’ (ibid. 
373). The problem here is that while he explicitly rejects such totalising notions as 
Centre and Subject, his alternative conception of social reality – as a perpetual 
differentiation of systems – runs the risk of becoming equally totalising. 
The development of systematisation is one that is regarded as capable of 
tendentially resolving social negativity and opacity. By conceiving society in terms of 
an immune system, he effectively reduces the notion of the political to one of simple 
adjustment (or ‘noise abatement’). Politics becomes a mere problem of perturbation 
that can be neutralised within the basic framework of the societal system and in such a 
way that autopoiesis proceeds undisturbed (ibid. 373).  
 
System failure 
Reintroducing the political 
 
The essential question that begs to be answered in Luhmann’s analysis is what are the 
conditions of possibility for system formation as such? In addition, how should the 
frontiers of a system be conceived? 
For Luhmann systems exist as a basic phenomenalism. As in a complex 
organism, systems develop through processes of differentiation that augment 
coherence and regularity and each system functions as difference within an overall 
process of differentiation (ibid. 208). By basing his analysis on a pure logic of 
differentiation (a logic that embodies systematicity as such), Luhmann advances a 
vision of the social universe in terms of a constant, and in principle limitless, 
expansion of systems; an expansion that constantly resolves its problems (negativity) 
along Hegelian lines. 
From a postmarxist perspective this vision is defective. In the first place, the 
formation of systems depends fundamentally on the construction of frontiers of 
antagonism against an irreducible negativity. Systems can only be systems in relation 
to what they are not: as orders of intelligibility carved out against that which would 
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overwhelm them. And it is because frontiers are always precarious in the face of such 
negativity that they may be said to establish the conditions of possibility and 
impossibility for all systems. 
Luhmann is correct in his observation that any attempt to represent what is 
beyond ‘meaning-constituting’ systems is ultimately interior to those systems and 
merely leads to their extension: put in other terms, the significance of any ‘beyond’ 
always involves a system of signification. Within the Luhmannian paradigm of a 
continuous logic of (positive) differentiation limits become strictly unthinkable. A 
differential approach to limits is evidently self-defeating as it would mean 
transforming the latter into a difference within the system – thereby rendering 
ineffectual their function as limits. 
The effectivity of a true limit derives from an entirely opposing register – that 
of negativity. A limit is only instituted as the result of the failure of a system and a 
radical interruption/suspension of its differential logic. The limit of a system emerges 
precisely at the point where a system cannot incorporate or represent a set of elements 
and in consequence excludes the latter as Other. Limits, therefore, are produced as 
orders of equivalence and not difference (see Laclau 1996). Every limit depends upon 
a certain dichotomy between an equivalential order of those elements perceived as 
belonging to a system and a corresponding equivalential exclusion of those elements 
identified as a ‘threat’ to that system. In short, limits are always of the type 
system/anti-system. 
This evidently does not mean that limits remain fixed in a once-and-for-all 
manner. Limits can always be subverted and re-drawn precisely because they are 
penetrated by negativity. In this sense limits are always historically defined. Yet what 
is transhistorical is the fact that limits per se cannot be eradicated. For example, a 
moral system that is designed to maximise tolerance in respect of cultural differences 
is one that is also compelled ‘violently’ to exclude its Other: racial bigotry, 
xenophobia, cultural chauvinism and so forth. The very possibility of a system of 
differential tolerance is one that depends on, and grows out of, the equivalential 
negation of that which is deemed to be intolerable.  
Three points should be emphasised. First, a system can only be instituted 
through logics of exclusion and antagonism that in providing the sense of limits are 
constitutive and affirming of its positive content (a ‘not-system’ in order for a 
‘system’). Accordingly every system is a power construction that relies upon the 
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repression of its Other. This insight is decisive in turning foundationalism on its head. 
Systems do not possess positive grounds but are shown to grow out of negativity and 
antagonism. It is not that systems are foundation-less, but rather that ‘foundations’ are 
made (not discovered) through political processes of exclusion and delimitation. 
This means – second point - that the political can be seen to be a fundamental 
dimension of every system. In the absence of pre-existing grounds or generative 
principles, all systems are ultimately political to the extent that they are constituted 
through acts of violence and exclusion. A legal system, for example, cannot be 
legalised in an external or absolutist sense, but depends upon discursive fiat and 
contexts of social power: ‘these commandments and not those’. This is precisely what 
Derrida means when he speaks of the ‘violence of the law before the law’ (1994: 31): 
that is, a political intervention that sustains the possibility of a legal system only to the 
extent that it shows its impossibility as a natural positivity. 
Every system is marked by an originary discursive violence, an arbitrary ‘line 
in the sand’, that seeks to establish a certain territorial coherence vis-à-vis radical 
undecidability. Through processes of routinisation and sedimentation, systems 
typically attempt to finesse their artificiality by concealing the political nature of their 
origins behind a particular idealism. In search of authenticity, the violence of a system 
tends to be disavowed through reference to an external and tautological principle – 
destiny, divinity, dynasty (‘the way it is/always has been’) – and, more especially, 
through the invocation of certain mysterious laws of history, nature, the market, God 
and so forth. We might say that what is missing is the psychoanalytic insight into the 
obscene supplement (of violence and repression) that necessarily accompanies every 
system and upon which the latter implicitly relies (see also Gammon and Palan this 
volume). This gives rise to an irresolvable tension: (i) autopoietic mechanisms seek to 
gentrify systems through artificially inducing closure and by presenting them as 
natural and universal; but (ii) the repressed-excessive dimension, which is constitutive 
of a system, is something that can never be mastered and thus all ‘closure’ and 
‘universality’ is inherently compromised. It is in this tension between systems and 
their ungovernable excesses that the political is continuously re-born. 
In consequence, and as a final point, systems are essentially prone to failure 
and can always be challenged and subverted by precisely those forces that are 
antagonised/excluded by a system. An important corollary of this is that failure cannot 
be reduced to an internal moment of autopoietic readjustment. Rather failure 
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designates the eruption of those events and antagonisms that are external to the 
system in the sense that they cannot be managed or represented within the terms of the 
latter.2 Moreover, there exists a fundamental gap between the failure of a system and 
the processes of recomposition; a gap through which the ontological possibility of the 
political emerges. Whether a failure will be resolved through fascist, socialist, social 
democratic or some other means, is not something that can be derived from the failure 
in and of itself: this will depend on the outcome of a hegemonic struggle in a 
particular context. Failure is not merely a transition in the unfolding of a pre-given 
principle of intelligibility but rather the very degeneration of the latter. 
System failure is one that leads to a widening of the realm of the possible – a 
reactivation of the political – in which a diversity of social forces will compete to 
establish new principles of ordering and intelligibility that will in turn affect the 
dimensioning of systems and the nature of their autopoietic functioning. What 
postmarxism enables us to grasp is the susceptibility of autopoiesis itself to 
hegemonic re-formulations; re-formulations that are essentially possible because of 
the central impossibility of mastering failure and negativity. 
 
 
Casino capitalism 
 
Luhmann’s perspective may be said to reflect a particular tension in contemporary 
thought between what might be called the epistemological and aspirational 
dimensions of modernity. The modernist paradigm can be understood as a series of 
rationalist attempts to subordinate the political within an overall system of integration 
where basic antagonisms have been eliminated. In the contemporary era, there has 
been a clear distancing from such rationalism and its totalitarian propensities. At the 
same time, writers like Bell (2000), Fukuyama (1992) and Rorty (1989) – who would 
endorse this distancing – nevertheless affirm the tendential emergence of a new 
holistic order: global liberal capitalism. In this way, a certain embodiment of the 
modernist aspiration – an ultimate systematisation – is presented as having somehow 
survived the epistemological ruination of modernism as such. From this point of view, 
liberal capitalism and human destiny are seen to comprise a synchronicity that is 
being historically realised. 
More recently, this tendency is reflected in the fashionable, and increasingly 
influential, thesis of ‘natural capitalism’ developed by Hawken et al. For these authors 
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natural capitalism is concerned with the creation of a new industrial revolution that 
accords with planetary eco-systems and responds to the ‘basic principles that govern 
the earth’ (1999: 313). Production should be developed in terms of ‘bio-mimicry’ and 
a holistic system of valuation should be established: 
To make people better off requires no new theories, and needs only common 
sense. It is based on the simple proposition that all capital be valued. While 
there may be no “right” way to value a forest, a river, or a child, the wrong 
way is to give it no value at all. (Hawken et al 1999: 321) 
What the natural capitalists envisage is a steady process of bringing the 
‘house’ of capitalism into good order; of establishing an (ontological) economic 
harmony that fulfils the promise of capitalism as the true human paradigm. Socio-
environmental problems can be resolved by factoring them in to the economic 
calculus of capitalism and in such a way that the latter can achieve its full potential. 
This idea of a progressive overcoming of all distortion and exclusion is paradigmatic 
of the dominant liberal approach to globalization. The liberal think tank, the 
Globalization Institute, sees the matter this way: 
Globalization is the increasing integration of the global economy to bring 
together rich and poor countries…Only by integrating the poorest into the 
world economy can we put an end to the poverty that still blights much of the 
world today (http//www.globalizationinstiute.org) 
What the liberal myth disavows is the fact that capitalism of necessity is a 
power system of exclusion. While capital works ceaselessly to transform and 
commodify all existing social relations, what it refuses to bargain with (in fact, cannot 
bargain with) is precisely its exploitative conditions of possibility. What, for example, 
would happen if the cost of exploitation – the extraction of surplus value from 
workers, the immiseration of vast sectors of the world’s population (one in every five 
are condemned to live on less than $1 per day) – was actually factored into the 
economic calculus of capitalism? Confronted with its own code of organization it 
would simply implode. Within the strict terms of the capitalist paradigm what cannot 
be valuated are its very symptoms of global privation and social injustice. Capitalism 
cannot ingest the excesses upon which it relies for its constitution. One of the most 
striking features of this constitutive excess is the so-called foreign debt. This debt is 
now so extreme, so permanent, that it cannot properly be accounted within existing 
conventions. The quantification of this debt appears increasingly arbitrary and absurd. 
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In the modern age, the foreign debt - a debt which, in practical terms, is beyond 
calculation and is exorbitant in relation to any possibility of actually being met - is 
rather the name (or one of the names) for the structural dislocation, the traumatic 
failure, of global capitalism as a universal system. 
What Marx sought to disclose was precisely the pathological element (of 
power and exclusion) behind the ‘neutral’ calculus of capitalism. While the latter is a 
radical universal force (bursting every provinciality asunder), at the same time it is 
manifestly parochial in its social tendentiousness. Through processes of gentrification 
(or autopoiesis) capitalism strives to institute itself as the global order through a 
disavowal of its politico-discursive violence. 
It is interesting in this context to look at the type of (implicit) critique that 
Scorsese develops in his excellent Casino. In this film, Scorsese explores the dual-
edged nature of capitalism through his two main characters: Sam ‘Ace’ Rothstein 
(Robert de Niro) and Nicky Santoro (Joe Pesce). As in Marx’s notion of primitive 
accumulation, Nicky may be said to reflect the primitive, or foundational, violence of 
capitalism; a violence that is integral to the construction of a casino system in the 
deserts of Los Angeles and to sustaining a power base for its operation (‘pre-legal’ 
reliance on corruption, money-laundering, extortion and so on). As time progresses, 
however, Nicky becomes an increasing liability as he constantly seeks to reinforce his 
position through crude acts of gangsterism. What Nicky fails to appreciate, and what 
the character of Ace is all too aware of, is that the power of the casino resides 
precisely in it being a self-reproducing autopoietic system. It naturalises its violence 
through its obscene calculations of ‘chance’ such that the house always, ultimately, 
wins. In this context, we might say that Nicky represents the excessive drive, the 
monstrous face, of capitalism; an ugly reminder of the casino system’s origins who 
must be disavowed and consigned to the periphery. And thus on the orders of certain 
corporate interests (that remain anonymous) he is taken to the desert to meet the 
gruesome fate of being buried alive. 
In a similar way, we could say that the contemporary system of capitalism 
endeavours to gentrify itself through a disavowal of the crude reality of 
exploitation/privation and by pushing its necessary measures of violent repression to 
the internal and external peripheries of the world. In this way, neo-liberal ideology 
attempts to naturalise capitalism by presenting its outcomes of winning and losing as 
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if they were simply a matter of chance and sound judgement in a neutral marketplace 
(see also Peterson this volume). 
It could further be argued that today’s model of hospitality is the casino itself. 
The casino is, in principle, open to all those who have money and are prepared to play 
by the rules. At the same time there are significant categories of exclusion: those who 
win excessively – consistently successful gamblers tend to be banned for playing the 
game(s) too well; those who lose excessively – gamblers who take the game(s) too 
seriously and risk all to beat the house system; those who are excessively proximate – 
local people are typically banned from gambling in the casinos. 
The hospitality of contemporary capitalism can be seen to function along 
similar lines: (i) the constant reproduction of a demographic of debt – the endless 
invitations to take out loans to deal with existing loans (rather than escape the cycle of 
debt altogether); (ii) the withdrawal of participatory credit from those who take it too 
literally – those who in a sense embody the very nature of fictitious capital; (iii) the 
maintenance of a critical distance from the Other – a kind of postmodern culture of 
neighbourliness without having to deal with real neighbours as such (e.g. the migrant 
who wants to take up residence, the inert presence of the poor etc.). 
In contrast to Kant’s affirmation of an open and cosmopolitan approach to 
hospitality, the increasing tendency in contemporary capitalism is towards a far more 
conditioned hospitality that we might characterise as megalopolitan3: that is a 
hospitality whose fate and frontiers of belonging/non-belonging are determined and 
co-ordinated through the key megalopolises – New York, Berlin, London, Hong Kong 
and so on – of a global power structure that endeavours to domesticate the universal 
and, by extension, the political itself. 
 
The economy of the political 
It is in this context that we should address the economy of the political: that is, the 
historical determination of the parameters of possibility. The central emphasis here is 
on the way in which the play of the political tends to be conditioned by a meta-
political logic (which itself is a thoroughly political construction); in postmarxist 
terms, it stresses the way in which hegemony itself can become effectively 
hegemonised by certain key themes and rules of political engagement that govern its 
economy. 
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Let’s take the voguish development of ‘business ethics’ and the way that this 
is becoming increasingly standardized in terms of a postmodern political correctness – 
respecting difference, valorising the personal and so on. The British inventor and 
entrepreneur, James Dyson, has been acclaimed as a role model for a new type of 
business culture both in terms of his development of innovative ‘green’ forms of 
technology (esp. the vacuum cleaner) and through a hands-on leadership/managerial 
approach that encourages participation and creativity among employees. At a critical 
point of expansion, however, it was decided in 2004 that the majority of his plant 
would have to move to Malaysia. Breaking out of the old mode of industrial relations, 
the response of the company was to set up a series of ‘listening committees’ to deal 
with the resultant eight hundred redundancies and to provide personalised advice and 
support. While this management-with-a-human-face approach was widely accepted as 
both positive and responsible, what remained beyond question was the legitimacy of 
the decision to export production – this was simply accepted as a fatum. Thus what 
we have is the political development of a new form of business ethical practice but 
only to the extent that it represses a more radical and substantive form of politico-
ethical engagement. 
This implicit acceptance of what is possible is emblematic of mainstream 
political culture. From New Labour to the ‘third way’ and even Beck’s (1992) ‘new 
enlightenment’ there is a paradigmatic tendency towards the pragmatic in addressing 
what is viewed as the ‘common problems’ of the economy, environment, technology 
and so on. Lyotard (1984) is fully justified in his characterisation of the contemporary 
attitude as one of incredulity towards radical forms of political engagement. The 
global vision of a New World Order is seen very much in terms of a mere expansion 
of liberal capitalism where the megalopolitan power structures remain firmly in place. 
Any real transformation – power sharing and a meaningful redistribution of wealth (as 
opposed to the relatively superficial idea of ‘debt’ cancellation) – is viewed with the 
utmost scepticism and is quickly consigned to the domain of the ‘unrealistic’. In this 
way the political tends to become economized; subject to a logic of autopoietic 
reflexivity that provides a kind of elementary grid for its functioning. 
It is against this background that the distinctive theoretical attitudes towards 
the notion of class can be situated. In much of post-structuralist and postmarxist 
thought the analytical use of class has been rejected on the grounds that it presupposes 
a unified and incomplex agency that is pre-programmed for social revolution. Laclau, 
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for example, rightly points out that the socially more cohesive forms of industrial 
working class are tending to disappear from the developed economies and that the 
political orientation of the popular classes (as Gramsci knew well) cannot be predicted 
in advance or independently of historical context (Laclau in Butler et al, 2000: 296-
301). For Žižek, by contrast, class is something that connotes the primary form of 
social antagonism under capitalism (see Žižek & Daly 2004: 146-150). 
While there is no simple ‘third way’, I think that the merits of both positions 
can be in fact maintained by changing the terms of debate. That is to say, class should 
not be regarded, in the traditional ‘scientific Marxist’ sense, as a positive identity but 
rather the opposite: a signifier of embodied negativity; something that again bears 
witness to the traumatic failure of megalopolitan capitalism. In this sense of the 
embodied negativity or symptoms of capitalism, class designates the socially 
excluded, the outcast, the destitute and today’s figure of the ‘migrant’. 
In this respect we might say that class is approximative of Lacan’s use of the 
alchemical term caput mortuum (death’s head). The caput mortuum is the residue, the 
indivisible remainder, after all that is of value has been extracted in a particular 
process. It is that which is excluded from the sphere of positive value and yet is 
integral to its production – it represents the (negativized) truth of such a sphere. Fink 
explains its functioning in the context of a numerical chain of signification: 
The caput mortuum contains what the chain does not contain; it is in a sense 
the other of the chain. The chain is as unequivocally determined by what it 
excludes as by what it includes, by what is within as by what is without. The 
chain never ceases to not write the numbers that constitute the caput mortuum 
in certain positions, being condemned to ceaselessly write something else or 
say something else which keeps avoiding this point, as though this point were 
the truth of everything the chain produces as it beats around the bush (Fink, 
1995: 27). 
Class would seem to have the same paradoxical status vis-à-vis today’s 
emphasis on the identitarian chain of ‘alliance politics’. That is to say, class functions 
as something that cannot be positively ‘named’ within the chain as if it were one more 
difference and yet is the very (negativized) sticking point – a kind of existential tort – 
that renders the latter possible. 
A central imperative of a radical politics must be the development of a 
defining solidarity with the abject classes; one that faces up to our ethical implication 
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in the production of global abjection in systemic terms (see also Amoore this volume). 
This solidarity of excess would mean moving beyond the current postmodern 
economy of the political and its identitarian logic – precisely because, as with the 
caput mortuum, the symptoms of social negativity are constitutively debarred from, 
and excessive to, such an economy. It would be a solidarity based upon a fundamental 
disclosure of the constitutive pre-conditions of this economy. 
The perspective that has been outlined here is one that seeks a broader 
approach to political economy and in such a way that it enables us to critique and to 
confront the economy (the historical circumscription) of the possible. In this context it 
affirms a politics that does not defer to house rules but which is prepared to take on 
directly today’s silently accepted markers of impossibility. 
 
 
Notes 
 
1. Literally meaning self-creation - from the Greek poiesis (creation). Autopoiesis first 
achieved currency with the thought of Maturana and Varela (Maturana and Varela 
1980, 1987; Varela 1979), where it was applied to the field of biology. In this 
context, autopoiesis refers to a cybernetic description of cell metabolism whereby a 
cell establishes its coherence and consistency (its ‘inside’) through the mutual 
interaction and reinforcement of its components against its ‘outside’. 
 
2. For example, the popular mobilisations against the system of apartheid. The 
externality here clearly does not imply an ‘extra-discursive’ but rather a 
deformation of the existing system from a position of equivalential resistance to it. 
 
3. The distinction that I am using between the cosmopolitan and the megalopolitan is 
tendential rather than absolute. 
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